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 2057 
THE IMPACT OF MARIJUANA 
DECRIMINALIZATION ON LEGAL 
PERMANENT RESIDENTS: WHY LEGALIZING 
MARIJUANA AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY 
Abstract: Although the federal government has remained firmly committed to 
prohibiting marijuana, many states have legalized the drug for either medical or 
recreational use. Others have merely decriminalized it, lowering the penalties as-
sociated with its use such that defendants charged with marijuana-related offens-
es are less likely to face incarceration. Most Americans stand to benefit from this 
change, as it means they face fewer meaningful consequences within the criminal 
justice system. By contrast, noncitizen offenders, including legal permanent resi-
dents (LPRs), may actually be disadvantaged by it. For example, LPRs living in 
jurisdictions that have decriminalized marijuana may mistakenly believe that it is 
safe to admit to marijuana use when communicating with immigration agents or 
law enforcement personnel. Due to the broad language of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, however, such an admission can result in significant, adverse 
immigration consequences. Additionally, decriminalization makes it is less likely 
that indigent LPRs will receive court-appointed counsel to advise them of the 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to seemingly minor marijuana-
related charges. Although legalizing marijuana at the federal level would certain-
ly address this issue, the federal government has repeatedly failed to enact such 
legislation. As such, states have stepped in, implementing various programs to 
protect their indigent, noncitizen residents. Although each has taken significant 
steps in the right direction, few have tackled the issue head-on. 
INTRODUCTION 
In April 2018, the United States deported Sothy Kum, a legal permanent 
resident (LPR) who immigrated from Cambodia when he was only two years 
old.1 The grounds for his deportation was a February 2014 conviction for pos-
                                                                                                                      
 1 Ting-Chia Kan, Wisconsin Man—Who Arrived in U.S. in ’81 as Cambodian Refugee—Is Deported 
for Marijuana Offenses, Leaving Behind His Wife and New Baby, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 08, 2019), https://
www.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-nw-wisconsin-immigrant-deported-marijuana-conviction-
20190807-znilzvcm75clvmpy5c3teqr6sa-story.html [https://perma.cc/MQ7Q-BZHF]. Sothy, accom-
panied by his family, fled Cambodia and, as a result, spent years residing at refugee camps in both 
Thailand and the Philippines. Marnette Federis, Deported to Cambodia, THE WK. (June 1, 2018), 
https://theweek.com/articles/774834/deported-cambodia [https://perma.cc/E7PP-HB34]. Although 
Sothy left Cambodia when he was two years old, he did not arrive in the United States until he was 
approximately six. Id. 
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session of marijuana with intent to deliver for which he was sentenced to three 
years of probation, plus community service.2 Almost two years later, in De-
cember 2015, law enforcement personnel found marijuana at Sothy’s place of 
work.3 Although Sothy vehemently maintained that the marijuana did not be-
long to him, the court considered it a violation of his probation and, as a result, 
ordered him to spend a year in prison.4 Immediately after his release, Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) took Sothy to a nearby immigration de-
tention center.5 He remained there for over seven months before he was de-
ported, leaving his wife and young daughter behind.6 
Sothy’s story is not unusual.7 Between 2003 and August 2018, it is esti-
mated that the U.S. government deported more than 45,000 individuals across 
the country for mere possession of marijuana.8 And, although Sothy was con-
victed in Wisconsin, where marijuana is illegal for all purposes, his story is not 
unique to individuals living in states with such stringent prohibitions.9 In fact, 
even in states that have decriminalized marijuana, noncitizens face severe im-
                                                                                                                      
 2 Kan, supra note 1. A postal inspector determined that a package sent to the Kum family’s home 
contained marijuana. Id. Sothy admitted that he had agreed to send several packages of marijuana to 
make additional income for his small business. Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. Sothy claimed that another person had left the marijuana at the office. Id. Only two weeks 
into Sothy’s prison sentence, his wife discovered that she was pregnant. Id. In August 2016, she gave 
birth to their daughter while Sothy was still in prison. Id. 
 5 Id. ICE, a division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), declares that it is committed 
to “protect[ing] America from the cross-border crime and illegal immigration that threaten national 
security and public safety.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/immigration-and-customs-enforcement [https://perma.cc/NQ6U-Z44S]. 
 6 Kan, supra note 1. Sothy, who moved to Phnom Penh, Cambodia after his deportation, knew 
nobody when he first arrived. Id. The majority of his family, including his father, siblings, and adult 
son, still resided in the United States. Id. 
 7 See Federis, supra note 1 (noting that, in early April 2018, the United States deported forty-
three immigrants to Cambodia). When Sothy was deported, he was part of the largest group of Cam-
bodians to be deported at once since the country began welcoming deportees from the United States. 
Id. Indeed, before the early 2000s, the Cambodian government had been reluctant to accept deportees 
from the United States because many had left Cambodia when they were very young or, in some cas-
es, were born in other countries. Id. Moreover, Cambodia found that many deportees did not have the 
documentation necessary to demonstrate their Cambodian citizenship. Id. Notably, the number of 
individuals the United States has deported to Cambodia has drastically increased over time. Id. Be-
tween 2003 and 2016, the United States deported approximately 750 Cambodians. Id. Not only is the 
United States deporting an increasing number of immigrants to Cambodia, but the process has been 
expedited as well. Id. Whereas Sothy’s case took almost two years to complete, the process now takes 
just a couple of weeks. Id. 
 8 Kan, supra note 1. In 2013, the “fourth most common cause of deportation for any offense” was 
“simple cannabis possession.” H.R. 3884, 116th Cong. § 2(9) (2d Sess. 2020). 
 9 See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 961.41(3g) (West 2020) (providing that a first offense of marijuana 
possession is punished by up to six months in prison, a fine of up to one thousand dollars, or both); 
Kan, supra note 1 (noting that, although Governor Tony Evers has expressed interest in decriminaliz-
ing possession of small amounts of marijuana, doing so would do little to protect noncitizens because 
the drug remains illegal federally). 
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migration consequences for marijuana-related offenses because federal law, 
which criminalizes the possession of marijuana, controls.10 This applies to 
LPRs who, despite having many of the same rights and responsibilities as U.S. 
citizens, experience equally harsh outcomes.11 
In some ways, in fact, LPRs residing in the increasingly large number of 
states that have either legalized or decriminalized marijuana may be at an even 
greater disadvantage than those residing elsewhere in the country.12 For one, 
noncitizens convicted of marijuana-related offenses in states that have decrim-
inalized the drug will no longer serve prison time and, as a result, will be less 
likely to receive court-appointed counsel because, according to Supreme Court 
precedent, the Sixth Amendment only guarantees counsel where incarceration 
is imposed.13 Although the impossibility of incarceration is something to be 
celebrated for the average, citizen offender, it could be disastrous for nonciti-
zens who do not receive critical advice regarding the immigration consequenc-
es of pleading guilty to seemingly minor offenses.14 Additionally, the relaxa-
tion of marijuana laws can lead noncitizens to believe that they can safely ad-
mit to using or possessing marijuana when communicating with government 
agents or other law enforcement personnel.15 This belief is misguided, howev-
er, because a mere admission to marijuana-related conduct can lead to signifi-
cant immigration consequences.16 
This Note explores the negative effects of marijuana decriminalization on 
LPRs.17 Part I of this Note describes how federal and state governments’ stanc-
es on marijuana have developed over time and explores how criminal convic-
tions can, as a general matter, have adverse immigration consequences for LPR 
                                                                                                                      
 10 KATHY BRADY, ZACHARY NIGHTINGALE & MATT ADAMS, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., 
PRACTICE ADVISORY: IMMIGRATION RISKS OF LEGALIZED MARIJUANA 1 (2018). 
 11 Id. 
 12 See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment, in con-
junction with the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to 
prison unless the state provided him or her with court-appointed counsel). 
 14 See id. (holding that indigent criminal defendants who are not sentenced to prison are not enti-
tled to court-appointed counsel under the Sixth Amendment). 
 15 BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra note 10, at 1. Accounts from noncitizens indicate that, 
in some parts of the country, agents from ICE, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are asking noncitizens whether they have ever 
possessed marijuana in hopes of finding them inadmissible. Id. at 1–2. 
 16 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having com-
mitted, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or 
a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign 
country relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.”). 
 17 See infra notes 18–203 and accompanying text. Although this issue is not unique to LPRs, the 
effects of marijuana decriminalization on other categories of noncitizens are beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
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offenders.18 Additionally, it illustrates the circumstances in which the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a public de-
fender.19 Part II of this Note describes the specifically adverse immigration 
consequences LPRs can face for marijuana-related offenses.20 Moreover, it 
explains how decriminalization may actually disadvantage LPRs.21 Finally, 
Part III of this Note explains that the federal government has historically been 
reluctant to legalize marijuana at the federal level, leaving states to mitigate the 
effects themselves.22 Additionally, it analyzes the Marijuana Opportunity Re-
investment and Expungement Act, a recent attempt at ending the federal ban 
on marijuana.23 
I. FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS’ STANCES ON  
MARIJUANA AND THE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES  
OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS FOR LPRS 
Marijuana is one issue over which state and federal laws conflict.24 Sec-
tion A of this Part demonstrates that although many states have legalized mari-
juana, the federal government continues to classify it as a controlled sub-
stance.25 Section A also explains how the federal government has advised fed-
eral prosecutors operating in states where the drug is legal to proceed given the 
conflicting laws.26 Section B provides background information about the U.S. 
immigration system and LPR status specifically.27 Additionally, it explains that 
certain criminal offenses can make LPRs deportable, inadmissible, unable to 
obtain U.S. citizenship, or ineligible for certain forms of discretionary relief.28 
                                                                                                                      
 18 See infra notes 30–106 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 107–136 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 137–171 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 172–193 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 194–203 and accompanying text. 
 24 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug), with, e.g., CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1, 11357 (2021) (removing penalties altogether for adults twenty-years or 
older who possess 28.5 grams or less of marijuana). Certain chemicals in the plant Cannabis sativa L., 
called cannabinoids, can have a psychoactive effect. JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
LSB10482, STATE MARIJUANA “LEGALIZATION” AND FEDERAL DRUG LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
FOR CONGRESS 1 (2020). For example, cannabis that contains substantial amounts of the chemical 
cannabinoid delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol may be used as a recreational drug. Id. The non-
psychoactive cannabinoid cannabidiol, by contrast, may be used for medicinal purposes. Id. Cannabis 
can be classified as either marijuana or hemp under federal law. Id. at 2. Other than a few exceptions, 
however, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) generally categorizes the plant and its derivatives as 
“marihuana.” Id. 
 25 See infra notes 30–73 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 30–73 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 74–106 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 74–106 and accompanying text. 
2021] The Impact of Marijuana Decriminalization on Legal Permanent Residents 2061 
Finally, Section C describes the circumstances in which the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees an indigent criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel.29 
A. The Trend Toward Legalizing Marijuana 
Although the federal government considers marijuana an illegal sub-
stance, many states have abandoned this position.30 Subsection 1 describes 
how the federal prohibition on marijuana came about, focusing primarily on 
the “war on drugs” of the late twentieth century.31 Subsection 2 explains how 
states have gradually moved away from the federal prohibition on marijuana 
toward legalization of the drug.32 Subsection 3 illustrates how the federal gov-
ernment has responded to these changes.33 Specifically, it describes the guid-
ance the federal government has given to federal prosecutors operating in 
states where the drug is legal.34 
1. Federal and State Prohibitions on Marijuana 
By the late 1930s, all fifty states had limited the use of marijuana, and 
thirty-five states had gone so far as to criminalize it.35 Similarly, in 1937, Con-
gress passed the Marijuana Tax Act, the first federal ban on marijuana.36 Its 
enactment is generally credited to Harry J. Anslinger, the first Commissioner 
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.37 Anslinger, who was troubled by the 
                                                                                                                      
 29 See infra notes 107–136 and accompanying text. 
 30 See Steve P. Calandrillo & Katelyn Fulton, “High” Standards: The Wave of Marijuana Legali-
zation Sweeping America Ignores the Hidden Risks of Edibles, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 210 (2019) (list-
ing the states that have legalized marijuana for both medical and recreational use as of the date of 
publication). 
 31 See infra notes 35–49 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 50–60 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text. 
 35 Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 209. States started restricting the use of marijuana as 
early as 1911. Id. at 207. On April 29, 1911, Massachusetts became the first state to prohibit marijuana. 
Keith Wagstaff, From Reefer Madness to Medical Marijuana: A Timeline of Weed Legalization in Amer-
ica, THE WK. (Oct. 23, 2013), https://theweek.com/articles/458311/from-reefer-madness-medical-
marijuana-timeline-weed-legalization-america [https://perma.cc/8A9B-QMUR]. Local governments 
followed suit not long after. Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 207. Indeed, in 1914, El Paso, 
Texas passed the first local ordinance preventing people from possessing or selling the drug. Id. 
States’ criminalization of the drug was due, at least in part, to the Uniform Law Commission’s pas-
sage of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in 1932, which promoted the criminalization of marijuana at 
the state level. Id. at 208–09. 
 36 Marijuana Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1969); see Calandrillo & 
Fulton, supra note 30, at 209 (explaining that the Marijuana Tax Act effectively criminalized the 
drug); Jordan Cunnings, Comment, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled 
Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 518 (2015) (describing the Mari-
juana Tax Act as the first federal prohibition on marijuana). 
 37 3 CYRIL H. WECHT & GERARD HORNBY, FORENSIC SCIENCES § 31K.02 (2021). The Depart-
ment of Treasury founded the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) in 1930. Harry Jacob Anslinger, 
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growing use of marijuana, began a war against the drug that would span ap-
proximately three decades.38 
It was not until 1970, however, that Congress officially criminalized the 
drug at the federal level by passing the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).39 
The CSA prohibits the unauthorized importation and distribution of any con-
trolled substance that Congress has determined provides little, if any, medici-
nal value and that has a high likelihood of abuse.40 It consists of a five-
schedule classification system.41 The schedule in which the CSA classifies a 
drug determines the extent to which it is regulated and the severity of the pen-
alties associated with its use.42 Because the CSA classifies marijuana as a 
Schedule I drug, it is highly regulated and federal offenses involving the sub-
stance carry relatively harsh sentences.43 
Shortly after the passage of the CSA, as part of his “tough on crime” poli-
cy, President Richard Nixon declared a “war on drugs.”44 Due in large part to 
                                                                                                                      
DRUG ENF’T ADMIN. MUSEUM, https://deamuseum.org/anslinger/in-charge/ [https://perma.cc/MC34-
AX2E]. Anslinger, who ran the FBN during the Great Depression, directed the agency’s limited re-
sources to defeating the world’s most powerful drug rings and putting an end to interstate drug traf-
ficking. Id. 
 38 See WECHT & HORNBY, supra note 37, § 31K.02 (contrasting Anslinger’s fear of marijuana 
with his lack of concern over heroin because heroin was historically seen as a problem experienced 
only by addicts and the African American population); see also Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, 
at 208 (emphasizing the length of Anslinger’s war against the drug). Among a number of other efforts, 
Anslinger was behind the notorious movie “Reefer Madness,” a form of government-sponsored prop-
aganda about the dangers of marijuana. WECHT & HORNBY, supra note 37, § 31K.02. The movie 
depicted a group of high school-aged teenagers whose lives were ruined by the drug. Reefer Madness, 
IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0028346/ [https://perma.cc/39GN-87EN]. 
 39 Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 100-709, 84 Stat. 1242–1284 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–904). Congress implemented the Controlled Substances Act, 
also known as the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act, because it believed that con-
trolled substances threaten “the health and general welfare of the American people.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 801(2). 
 40 See 21 U.S.C. § 811(c); Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 209 (describing the criteria 
used to determine whether a drug should be listed in the CSA). The CSA defines a “controlled sub-
stance” as “a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or 
V.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6). 
 41 21 U.S.C. § 812(a). Congress places drugs in one of the five schedules based on factors such as 
the likelihood of abuse, the impact that abuse of the drug can have on one’s health, and its medical 
benefits. Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 209. To be classified as a Schedule I drug, the sub-
stance must have “a high potential for abuse,” “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance under medical 
supervision.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 42 Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 209. 
 43 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug); LAMPE, supra note 24, at 3 
(indicating that simple possession of marijuana can result in a term of imprisonment of up to one year, 
whereas “illicit distribution of large quantities of marijuana” can result in a term of imprisonment of 
between ten years and life). For reference, other Schedule I drugs include heroin, LSD, and ecstasy. 
21 U.S.C. § 812(c). 
 44 See James Cooper, The United States, Mexico, and the War on Drugs in the Trump Administra-
tion, 25 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 234, 252 (2018) (contrasting President Nixon with 
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President Nixon’s framing of the drug problem as a national emergency, feder-
al and state legislators passed a series of laws to encourage law enforcement 
personnel to arrest and prosecute drug offenders to the full extent of the law. 45 
When President Ronald Reagan was elected in 1981, he significantly expanded 
President Nixon’s anti-drug policy.46 During his two terms in office, he intro-
duced legislation designed to deter illegal drug use by implementing harsh 
penalties.47 
Since then, the federal government’s stance on marijuana has remained 
largely unchanged.48 Indeed, lawmakers’ attempts to remove marijuana from 
the CSA have had little success.49 
                                                                                                                      
prior presidents who were not actively involved in drug policy). See generally Special Message to 
Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, PUB. PAPERS: NIXON, at 739 (June 17, 1971) (em-
phasizing the importance of federal legislation such as the CSA in combating the “national emergen-
cy” created by drug abuse). Significantly, the “war on drugs” disproportionately affected communities 
of color. See Cooper, supra, at 252 (stating that law enforcement and prosecutorial discretion in pursu-
ing drug offenders “open[ed] the door to exacerbated racial disparities”) (internal quotations omitted); 
Carrie Rosenbaum, What (and Whom) State Marijuana Reformers Forgot: Crimmigration Law and 
Noncitizens, 9 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 1, 2–3 (2016) (noting that African Americans and Latinos were 
more likely to be imprisoned than their white counterparts and, in some jurisdictions, to be imprisoned 
for longer periods of time). For example, studies have shown that Black men typically receive “drug 
sentences that are 13.1 percent longer than sentences imposed for White men.” H.R. 3884, 116th 
Cong. § 2(8) (2d Sess. 2020). Similarly, federal courts are approximately 6.5 times more likely to 
impose a sentence for cannabis possession on Latinos than non-Hispanic Whites. Id. This reality mir-
rors the racial bias that initially inspired the “war on drugs.” See Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, 
at 208 (stating that racial prejudice and anti-immigrant sentiments, particularly those directed at Afri-
can American and Mexican American immigrants, were the driving force behind criminalizing mari-
juana). 
 45 Cooper, supra note 44, at 252. 
 46 Id. at 253. President Reagan was joined by his wife, Nancy Reagan, in promoting anti-drug 
initiatives. Just Say No, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/1980s/just-say-no#section3 [https://
perma.cc/6XU9-BL4J]. In the early 1980s, she launched the “Just Say No” campaign to dissuade 
children and young adults from experimenting with drugs. Id. The campaign, which lasted more than 
a decade, successfully heightened the public’s concern over the nation’s drug problem. Id. 
 47 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Drug-Free 
Workplace Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 5151–5160, 102 Stat. 4181, 4304–4308; Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976. 
 48 See Zachary Ford, Comment, Reefer Madness: The Constitutional Consequence of the Federal 
Government’s Inconsistent Marijuana Policy, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 671, 675 (2019) (noting that the 
federal government remains insistent on criminalizing marijuana). But see Megan Brenan, Support for 
Legal Marijuana Inches Up to New High of 68%, GALLUP (Nov. 9, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/
poll/323582/support-legal-marijuana-inches-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/K5W3-JT4D] (noting 
that, in 2020, 68% of American adults support legalizing marijuana compared to 12% in 1969). The 
federal government’s insistence on criminalizing marijuana stems from its belief that the drug’s pro-
posed medical benefits are, at best, unfounded, that the drug is dangerous for users and their circles, 
and that people would buy and sell the drug in elicit markets. Ford, supra, at 675. 
 49 Ford, supra note 48, at 675 (noting that there have been repeated efforts to reschedule marijuana 
during the past forty-eight years); see, e.g., Marijuana Freedom and Opportunity Act, S. 3174, 115th 
Cong. (2018) (striking marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols from Schedule I of the CSA); Strengthen-
ing the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018) (providing 
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2. States Abandon the Federal Government’s Harsh Stance on Marijuana 
In the 1990s, evidence began to indicate that marijuana could provide var-
ious medical benefits and, as such, doctors began recommending the drug to 
their patients.50 For example, studies showed that marijuana could help indi-
viduals cope with anxiety and depression, relieve pain, lessen seizure disorder 
symptoms, and slow the progression of Alzheimer’s, among a number of other 
significant benefits.51 Thus, in the late 1990s, states began to legalize marijua-
na for medicinal use.52 Indeed, by 2018, thirty-three states, as well as the Dis-
trict of Columbia, had done so.53 It was not until 2012, however, that states 
began to legalize marijuana for recreational use as well.54 This development 
was due, at least in part, to the growing recognition that legalizing, and subse-
quently regulating, marijuana could be extremely profitable.55 
                                                                                                                      
that the provisions of the CSA that apply to marijuana “shall not apply to any person acting in compli-
ance with State law relating to the manufacture, production, possession, distribution, dispensation, 
administration, or delivery of marihuana”). Both Congress and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
have the authority to move a substance to a different schedule or to eliminate the substance from the 
CSA altogether. LAMPE, supra note 24, at 2. 
 50 See Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 210 (noting marijuana’s potential for relieving 
chronic pain and nausea in particular); Silvia Irimescu, Marijuana Legalization: How Government 
Stagnation Hinders Legal Evolution and Harms a Nation, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 241, 251–52 (2015) 
(explaining that many nonusers of marijuana began to use the drug for medicinal purposes due to the 
increasing recognition of its medical utility). 
 51 Irimescu, supra note 50, at 251–52. Other potential benefits of marijuana include treating glau-
coma, improving lung health, stopping the spread of cancer, treating inflammatory bowel disease, 
enhancing metabolism, and improving lupus symptoms. Id. 
 52 Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 210. Through Proposition 215, California became the 
first state to legalize medical marijuana. Id. The initiative, which passed in November 1996, made it 
legal for patients, as well as their caregivers, to grow and use marijuana if their physicians recom-
mended it. Lee Romney, Prop. 215 Passed, but Uncertainty Hasn’t, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 1997), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-01-05-mn-18103-story.html [https://perma.cc/5FVN-
HZUG]. Other states, including “Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington,” did 
the same shortly thereafter. Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 210. 
 53 Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 210. The legalization of marijuana for medicinal use 
was a difficult process, as each state had to contend with difficult policy questions, including how to 
implement an effective patient registry system that would protect registrants from arrest. Ford, supra 
note 48, at 677. 
 54 See Ford, supra note 48, at 677 (noting that it took sixteen years for states to begin legalizing 
recreational marijuana). The first states to legalize marijuana for recreational use were Washington 
and Colorado, but “Alaska, California, the District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, and Oregon” followed suit shortly thereafter. Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 210. In 
January 2020, Illinois became the eleventh state to legalize marijuana for recreational use. Alexander 
Bolton, Illinois Becomes 11th State to Legalize Marijuana, THE HILL (Jan. 1, 2020), https://thehill.
com/homenews/state-watch/476444-illinois-becomes-11th-state-to-legalize-marijuana [https://perma.
cc/9LKT-KF9D]. 
 55 See Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019, H.R. 3884, 116th 
Cong. § 2(5) (providing that “[l]egal cannabis sales totaled $9.5 billion in 2017 and are projected to 
reach $23 billion by 2022”); Irimescu, supra note 50, at 264, 266–67 (listing “monetary incentives” as 
one justification for legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana federally). The monetary incentive for 
legalizing marijuana is even greater when one considers the significant amount of money spent on its 
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Nevertheless, marijuana laws vary considerably from state to state. 56 
Whereas some states remain firmly committed to banning the drug within their 
borders others have elected to do the opposite, legalizing marijuana for all pur-
poses.57 Other states fall somewhere in between.58 Some, for example, have 
simply decriminalized the drug.59 Generally, decriminalization refers to laws 
that minimize the likelihood that marijuana possession will result in a criminal 
record or incarceration.60 
3. Addressing the Conflict Between Federal and State Marijuana Laws 
Despite states’ trend toward legalizing marijuana, the drug remains a 
Schedule I drug under the CSA.61 As a result, it was unclear how marijuana-
related conduct should be handled in states that legalized the drug.62 Recogniz-
                                                                                                                      
prohibition. See Irimescu, supra note 50, at 265–66 (emphasizing the large sums of money spent on 
the “war on marijuana”). Indeed, the enforcement of marijuana laws has cost taxpayers approximately 
$3.6 billion a year, according to the American Civil Liberties Union. H.R. 3884 § 2(6). Nevertheless, 
the country has seen few benefits. See Irimescu, supra note 50, at 265–66 (noting that it is well estab-
lished that incarceration is not the most effective means of preventing crime). 
 56 W. Scott Railton, Marijuana and Immigration, 32 CRIM. JUST. 14, 14 (2017). 
 57 Compare IND. CODE § 35-48-4-11 (2020) (providing that possession of marijuana generally 
constitutes a Class B misdemeanor), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.1, 11357 (removing 
penalties altogether for adults twenty-years or older who possess 28.5 grams or less of marijuana). In 
November 2020, Oregon became the first state to decriminalize possession of all drugs, including, but 
not limited to, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. Scott Akins & Clayton Mosher, Oregon Just 




all-drugs-heres-why-voters-passed-this-groundbreaking-reform]. The initiative passed with over 58% 
of the vote. Id. 
 58 See Cunnings, supra note 36, at 521–22 (noting that some states have legalized the drug for 
medicinal use only or have simply lowered the penalties associated with its use). 
 59 Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 764 
(2016). 
 60 Id. at 765. As such, the term “decriminalization” typically does not mean the elimination of all 
penalties for marijuana possession. Id. Indeed, these states typically permit law enforcement personnel 
to continue to conduct searches and make arrests. Id. Thus, even in states where the legislature has 
decriminalized marijuana, police officers still have the power to conduct pretextual stops. Id.; see 
Stop, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “pretextual stop” as “[a] police stop of a 
person or vehicle for fabricated reasons that are calculated to forestall or preclude constitutional objec-
tions”). There are several ways that a state can decriminalize marijuana. Cunnings, supra note 36, at 
526. Specifically, states can amend their statutes in ways that reduce the criminal penalties of mariju-
ana possession, instruct police officers to issue a summons rather than an arrest warrant, or direct law 
enforcement not to prioritize marijuana possession. Id.; Summons, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
(defining a summons as “[a] writ or process commencing the plaintiff’s action and requiring the de-
fendant to appear and answer”). 
 61 See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing marijuana as a Schedule I drug). 
 62 See Calandrillo & Fulton, supra note 30, at 213 (describing the federal government’s release of 
guidance on the matter). 
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ing this, the Department of Justice (DOJ) released several memoranda over the 
past several years to guide federal prosecutors operating in these states.63 
The first, known as the Ogden Memorandum, stated that as a general mat-
ter, federal prosecutors should not devote valuable resources to pursuing those 
who are in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with state laws permitting the 
use of medicinal marijuana.64 Nevertheless, the 2009 memorandum empha-
sized that the DOJ would remain committed to enforcing the CSA throughout 
the country.65 In other words, it stated that the memorandum should not be 
construed as legalizing marijuana or as permitting “clear and unambiguous 
compliance with . . . state law” as a legal defense to a CSA violation.66 
The second memorandum, the Cole Memorandum, which Deputy Attor-
ney General James Cole released in 2011, reiterated much of the guidance that 
the Odgen Memorandum provided.67 Specifically, the Cole Memorandum stat-
                                                                                                                      
 63 Id.; see, e.g., Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to All U.S. 
Atty’s, Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memorandum]; Memorandum 
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to All U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding Mari-
juana Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cole Memo]; Memorandum from James M. 
Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to U.S. Att’ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in 
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Cole 
Memo]; Memorandum of David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Selected U.S. 
Att’ys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana (Oct. 19, 
2009) [hereinafter Ogden Memo]. 
 64 Ogden Memo, supra note 63, at 2. Attorney General Ogden provided, for example, that federal 
prosecutors need not focus enforcement efforts on people with serious illnesses such as cancer whose 
doctors recommended marijuana as part of their treatment plans and whose use is consistent with 
relevant state law. Id. That said, when marijuana-related conduct is accompanied by violence or the 
unlawful use of firearms, for example, the conduct will generally not be in “clear and unambiguous 
compliance” with state law. Id. Other factors that typically ensure that marijuana-related conduct will 
not be in “clear and unambiguous compliance” with state law include: “sales to minors; financial and 
marketing activities inconsistent with the terms, conditions, or purposes of state law, including evi-
dence of money laundering activity and/or financial gains or excessive amounts of cash inconsistent 
with purported compliance with state or local law; . . . illegal possession or sale of other controlled 
substances; or ties to other criminal enterprises.” Id. 
 65 Id. This is the case, Attorney General Ogden noted, because Congress found that marijuana is 
“dangerous” and that its unlawful sale is a “serious crime.” Id. at 1. The gravity of the crime is due, at 
least in part, to the fact that it provides substantial revenue to “large-scale criminal enterprises, gangs, 
and cartels.” Id. 
 66 Id. at 2. 
 67 See 2011 Cole Memo, supra note 63, at 1 (stating that the Department of Justice (DOJ) will 
continue to enforce the CSA in all fifty states due to the seriousness of the illegal distribution and sale 
of marijuana). Indeed, the second memorandum expressly stated that the DOJ’s opinion as to the effi-
cient use of federal resources remained unchanged. Id. The DOJ released the 2011 memorandum 
because the Deputy Attorney General had allegedly received numerous requests for clarification on its 
position regarding the enforcement of the CSA in jurisdictions that had implemented, or had consid-
ered implementing, legislation authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes. Id. Additional-
ly, the DOJ released the new memorandum because the “scope of commercial cultivation, sale, distri-
bution, and use of marijuana for purported medical purposes” had expanded since the Ogden Memo’s 
release in 2009. Id. at 1–2. Specifically, Deputy Attorney General Cole noted that several states had 
enacted legislation authorizing “large-scale, privately-operated industrial marijuana cultivation cen-
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ed that federal prosecutors should not focus their enforcement efforts on those 
who rely on the substance for medicinal purposes only.68 
In 2013, the DOJ released a third memorandum that set forth a list of en-
forcement priorities.69 It directed DOJ attorneys and other law enforcement 
personnel to focus their efforts and resources on people and organizations that 
threatened one or more of the enforcement priorities, irrespective of state 
law.70 
Finally, in January 2018, Attorney General Jefferson Sessions released a 
memorandum stating that, when exercising discretion as to whether to prose-
cute marijuana-related activity, prosecutors should simply adhere to the “well-
established principles that govern all federal prosecutions.”71 These principles 
require federal prosecutors to consider all relevant factors in determining 
which cases to prosecute, including the severity of the crime, the likelihood of 
creating a deterrent effect, and the overall impact of the offenses on the com-
munity at large.72 Given these general principles, Attorney General Sessions 
reasoned that previous guidance on marijuana enforcement, including the Og-
den and Cole Memoranda, was no longer necessary.73 
                                                                                                                      
ters” in the past year. Id. at 2. He declared, however, that, regardless of state law, individuals violate 
the CSA by “cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana,” as well as by knowingly facilitating these 
activities. Id. 
 68 Id. at 1. Rather, federal prosecutors should direct their attention and resources to large-scale 
traffickers of illegal drugs, including marijuana. Id. The Cole Memorandum “hardly provoked a sea 
change in federal marijuana enforcement.” Lauren Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal 
Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 570 (2020) (noting that the 2013 memorandum did not create a 
discernable change in the number of federal marijuana prosecutions in Colorado). 
 69 2013 Cole Memo, supra note 63, at 1–2. The eight priorities listed in the 2013 memo include: 
(1) “[p]reventing the distribution of marijuana to minors”; (2) “[p]reventing revenue from the sale of 
marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels”; (3) “[p]reventing the diversion of 
marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some form to other states”; (4) “[p]reventing 
state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other 
illegal drugs or other illegal activity”; (5) “[p]reventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultiva-
tion and distribution of marijuana”; (6) “[p]reventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other 
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use”; (7) “[p]reventing the growing of 
marijuana on public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by mariju-
ana production on public lands”; and (8) “[p]reventing marijuana possession or use on federal proper-
ty.” Id. 
 70 Id. at 2. In an October 2014 memorandum, Director Wilkinson declared that the same eight 
priorities should guide the marijuana enforcement policy of U.S. Attorneys in Indian Country should 
the sovereign Indian Nations choose to legalize marijuana. Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir. 
of the Exec. Off. for U.S. Att’ys, to All U.S. Atty’s, et al., Policy Statement Regarding Marijuana 
Issues in Indian Country (Oct. 28, 2014). 
 71 Sessions Memorandum, supra note 63, at 1. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti introduced 
these principles in 1980, and they are codified in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual. Id.; see U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.230 (1980). 
 72 Sessions Memorandum, supra note 63. 
 73 Id. In a footnote, Attorney General Session’s memorandum made it clear that each of the mem-
oranda—the Ogden Memorandum, both Cole Memoranda, and the Wilkinson Memorandum—were 
revoked. Id. at 1 n.1. Notably, during now-Attorney General Merrick Garland’s Judiciary Committee 
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B. Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions for LPRs 
Although LPRs possess many of the same rights and responsibilities as 
U.S. citizens, they can face severe immigration consequences as a result of 
criminal convictions.74 Subsection 1 provides a brief summary of the American 
immigration system and describes the rights and responsibilities of LPRs.75 
Subsection 2 explains the immigration consequences of criminal convictions 
for LPRs.76 
1. The U.S. Immigration System and LPR Status 
U.S. immigration law is governed almost entirely by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).77 Several federal administrative agencies have the au-
thority to carry out the country’s immigration laws, including the DOJ, the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of State.78 
                                                                                                                      
confirmation hearing, he indicated that he would dedicate fewer resources toward the enforcement of 
federal marijuana laws, suggesting a return to the Ogden and Cole Memoranda policies. Cloe Pippin, 
Merrick Garland Signals New Stance on Marijuana Policy if Confirmed as Attorney General, JDSUPRA 
(Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/merrick-garland-signals-new-stance-on-8828319/ 
[https://perma.cc/98FP-F7GE]. He declined to confirm, however, whether he would actually reinstate 
the Cole Memorandum. Id. 
 74 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having com-
mitted, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or 
a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign 
country relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (providing that 
“[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regu-
lation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is de-
portable”). 
 75 See infra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
 76 See infra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. 
 77 Susan G. Roy, Walk/Don’t Walk: How the Legalization of Marijuana in New Jersey Will Affect 
Non-Citizens, N.J. LAW, Oct. 2018, at 78. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) consolidated 
the country’s immigration laws into one statutory framework. SARAH HERMAN PECK & HILLEL R. 
SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45151, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 2 
(2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45151.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5FA-2T4B]. The INA controls 
access to, and removal from, the United States, as well as the rights and responsibilities of noncitizens 
living in the country. JOSEPH MINSKY, INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE 14 (1989), Westlaw C394 ALI-ABA 1. 
 78 Roy, supra note 77, at 78. DHS is comprised of ICE, USCIS, and CBP. PECK & SMITH, supra 
note 77, at 2. ICE is primarily responsible for enforcing immigration laws within the country’s bor-
ders. Id. CBP, by contrast, oversees immigration enforcement at the border itself. Id. Finally, USCIS 
adjudicates applications for particular forms of relief and immigration benefits. Id. at 3. Prior to the 
enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created the DHS, the Attorney General had 
the authority to implement the country’s immigration laws, which he largely delegated to two agen-
cies within the DOJ: the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR). Id. at 2. The Homeland Security Act eliminated the INS and transferred 
the bulk of its responsibilities to the newly created DHS. Id.  
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The INA refers to noncitizens as “aliens.”79 It also divides aliens into 
three discrete categories: LPRs, nonimmigrants, and undocumented aliens. 80 
LPRs, commonly referred to as “green card holders,” are those who have been 
lawfully admitted into the United States and, after submitting an application 
and remaining in the country for a certain period of time, have been permitted 
to reside and work permanently in the United States.81 A noncitizen can obtain 
LPR status through a variety of avenues, including family ties or the posses-
sion of a particular work-related skill.82 
                                                                                                                      
 79 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (defining alien as “any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States”); see Immigrant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (defining an “alien immigrant” as 
an “immigrant who has not yet been naturalized”). As such, this Note may, at times, refer to nonciti-
zens as “aliens.” But see Nicole Acevedo, Biden Seeks to Replace ‘Alien’ with Less ‘Dehumanizing 
Term’ in Immigration Laws, NBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/biden-
seeks-replace-alien-less-dehumanizing-term-immigration-laws-n1255350 [https://perma.cc/JJ2U-
T9MM] (noting that President Joe Biden proposed removing the term “alien” from U.S. immigration 
laws in a comprehensive new immigration reform bill); Adrian Florido, Tracing the Shifting Meaning 
of ‘Alien,’ NPR (Aug. 22, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/08/22/432774244/
tracing-the-shifting-meaning-of-alien [https://perma.cc/97PE-AD6B] (noting that immigrant rights 
advocates contend that the term “alien” is “derogatory and dehumanizing”); Joel Rose, Immigration 
Agencies Ordered Not to Use Term “Illegal Alien” Under New Biden Policy, NPR (Apr. 19, 2021), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/04/19/988789487/immigration-agencies-ordered-not-to-use-term-illegal-
alien-under-new-biden-polic [https://perma.cc/9R66-9SUC] (explaining that President Biden ordered 
immigrant enforcement agencies to replace the term “illegal alien” with “undocumented noncitizen”); 
Elizabeth Rosenman, This New Year, Let’s Stop Using the Word ‘Alien,’ THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/423570-this-new-year-lets-stop-using-the-word-alien [https://
perma.cc/BML2-VZSD] (arguing that President Trump used the term “alien” to “pit his supporters 
against asylum seekers and other immigrants”). 
 80 MINSKY, supra note 77, at 14. A nonimmigrant is a person who has been lawfully admitted to 
the United States for a particular purpose. Id. at 15. Examples include students and tourists. Id. 
Nonimmigrants typically must keep a residence in their home country. Id. Moreover, they must intend 
to return there when their nonimmigrant status expires. Id. Undocumented aliens, on the other hand, 
are people who do not have permission to be present in the United States. Id. The distinction between 
different types of aliens is important because the INA handles each group differently—those who have 
permission to be in the United States are treated differently than those who do not. PECK & SMITH, 
supra note 77. For example, aliens who have been lawfully admitted to the United States may be re-
moved from the country if they behave in ways that render them deportable, whereas noncitizens who 
have not been lawfully admitted may be excluded or removed if they engage in behavior rendering 
them inadmissible. Id.; see Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.
gov/immigration-statistics/data-standards-and-definitions/definition-terms [https://perma.cc/6MWR-
A8KN] (defining an inadmissible alien as one who is “seeking admission at a port of entry who does 
not meet the criteria in the INA for admission” and a deportable alien as “[a]n alien in and admitted to 
the United States subject to any grounds of removal specified in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act”). 
 81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (“The term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’ means the 
status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as 
an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.”). According 
to the DHS, there were an estimated 13.2 million LPRs living in the United States as of January 1, 
2015. OFF. OF IMMIG. STAT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULA-
TION IN THE U.S.: JANUARY 2015, at 2 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
lpr_population_estimates_january_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ2Y-PN5Y]. 
 82 MINSKY, supra note 77, at 15. 
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When noncitizens finally obtain LPR status, they possess many of the 
same rights and responsibilities as U.S. citizens.83 Nevertheless, two signifi-
cant distinctions remain: LPRs cannot vote and they can be deported following 
specific criminal convictions.84 
Significantly, LPR status is a necessary step to obtaining U.S. citizen-
ship.85 LPR status, however, is not the only requirement for naturalization. 86 
Noncitizens must demonstrate, among other things, that they continuously re-
sided in the United States for a five-year period after receiving LPR status and 
that they were physically present in the country for at least half of that five-
year period.87 Particularly relevant here, noncitizens must also demonstrate 
“good moral character” for the five years preceding citizenship.88 Because nat-
uralization is a privilege rather than a right, the burden is on the noncitizen to 
demonstrate eligibility.89 
                                                                                                                      
 83 See Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discre-
tion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 643–44 (2012) (providing 
that LPRs have the right to live and work in the United States, the duty to pay taxes, and the ability to 
register for selective service); Wilber A. Barillas, Note, Collateral Damage: Drug Enforcement & Its 
Impact on the Deportation of Legal Permanent Residents, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 7 (2014) (stat-
ing that LPRs share the same access to schools as American citizens and, if permitted by the state’s 
legislature, can hold public office). 
 84 Barillas, supra note 83, at 7; see Reyes, supra note 83, at 644 (noting that LPRs lack “represen-
tation in the political process”). Criminal convictions are not LPRs’ only grounds for deportation, 
however. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (providing that noncitizens who are present in the United 
States in violation of U.S. immigration law are deportable); id. § 1227(a)(1)(E) (providing that any 
noncitizen who, within a certain period, has knowingly “encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or 
aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law is deportable”); id. 
§ 1227(a)(3)(A) (providing that, generally, a noncitizen who has violated 8 U.S.C. § 1305, which 
requires noncitizens to notify the Attorney General of any address change, is deportable). 
 85 Reyes, supra note 83, at 643. 
 86 See 3 SHANE DIZON & POOJA DADHANIA, IMMIGR. L. SERV. 2D, § 14:102, Westlaw (database 
updated Feb. 2021) (laying out the requirements for naturalization). Naturalization is “the conferring 
of nationality of a state upon a person after birth, by any means whatsoever.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(23). 
 87 See DIZON & DADHANIA, supra note 86, § 14:102 (describing the continuous residence and 
physical presence requirements for naturalization). Another requirement is that the noncitizen exhibit 
knowledge of U.S. history and government, which is no simple task. See id. (describing the citizenship 
test); Alexa Lardieri, 2 of 3 Americans Wouldn’t Pass U.S. Citizenship Test, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2018-10-12/2-of-3-americans-wouldnt-
pass-us-citizenship-test [https://web.archive.org/web/20210301190203/https://www.usnews.com/
news/politics/articles/2018-10-12/2-of-3-americans-wouldnt-pass-us-citizenship-test] (providing re-
sults from a study conducted by the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation that found that 
only 39% of Americans would be able to pass a test that contained questions from the citizenship 
test). 
 88 DIZON & DADHANIA, supra note 86, § 14:102; see infra notes 153–155 and accompanying text 
(describing the “good moral character” requirement). 
 89 See Tuton v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 578 (1926) (declaring that the Constitution does not 
give noncitizens the right to become U.S. citizens); DIZON & DADHANIA, supra note 86, § 14:106 
(stating that this burden is justified because, once granted, citizenship is difficult to withdraw, and, 
therefore, the government has a legitimate interest in making sure that only qualified individuals are 
able to naturalize). 
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2. Immigration Consequences of Criminal Convictions 
Noncitizens may be ineligible to enter or stay in the United States if they 
have committed particular criminal offenses.90 Some offenses, when commit-
ted by a noncitizen lawfully admitted to the United States, may trigger deporta-
tion proceedings.91 The criminal grounds for deportation are generally set forth 
in 8 U.S.C. § 1227.92 In addition, certain criminal offenses may preclude a 
noncitizen from being admitted to the United States.93 In other words, certain 
criminal offenses may make a noncitizen inadmissible.94 The criminal grounds 
for inadmissibility are provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).95 The criminal 
grounds for both deportability and inadmissibility include individual crimes 
and categories of crimes.96 
                                                                                                                      
 90 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 4. 
 91 Id. Moreover, the law provides that the Attorney General “shall” take into custody any nonciti-
zen that is found to be deportable under certain provisions of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). When ICE 
takes noncitizens into custody, it places them in an ICE detention facility, such as state and federal 
prisons and private detention centers. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES BY AGENCY 1, 3 (2020), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/
files/research/immigration_detention_in_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQY6-
6UKS]. As of December 9, 2019, almost 44,000 noncitizens were being held in over one hundred 
facilities and were kept there for an average of fifty-five days. Id. at 3–4. Noncitizens who were de-
tained throughout their immigration proceedings, however, were often held for more than six months. 
Id. at 4. This is particularly troublesome given the poor conditions of ICE detention centers. See id. 
(describing a complaint that the American Immigration Council filed in 2018 alleging that the Denver 
Contract Detention Facility denied treatment to those with serious medical conditions and provided 
deficient mental health care for its detainees). Moreover, detained immigrants, particularly those in 
facilities located in remote areas of the United States, have difficulty obtaining legal representation. 
Id. During fiscal year 2015, for example, 48% of detainees were, at one point or another, being held 
“at least 60 miles from the nearest nonprofit immigration attorney who practiced removal defense.” Id. 
Additionally, detainees’ access to phone calls and visits is often limited, making it difficult for detain-
ees who managed to retain counsel to communicate with them. Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, 
Due Process, and the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 127 
(2008). Notably, the Attorney General does have discretion to authorize release from detention in 
some circumstances. Barillas, supra note 83, at 13. Generally, however, the Attorney General may not 
release those placed in detention for a drug-related offense. Id. 
 92 8 U.S.C. § 1227. The criminal grounds for deportability include, but are not limited to, high 
speed flight from an immigration checkpoint, failure to register as a sex offender, and certain firearm, 
domestic violence, and human trafficking offenses. Id. 
 93 Id. § 1182. 
 94 See id. (defining inadmissible aliens as those who “are ineligible to receive visas and ineligible 
to be admitted to the United States”). 
 95 Id. § 1182(a)(2). Examples of criminal grounds for inadmissibility include prostitution, human 
trafficking, and money laundering, among others. Id. 
 96 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 5, 7. An example of a category of crimes is “crimes involving 
moral turpitude,” which can serve as the basis for both deportation and inadmissibility. Id. at 8. The 
phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is not defined by the INA and, therefore, is subject to courts’ 
interpretation. 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 71.05 & n.197.1 
(2019) (citing Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration Beyond the Headlines: The Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ Quiet Expansion of the Meaning of Moral Turpitude, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 267 (2019), 
https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2019/03/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Koh.pdf 
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The principal difference between the criminal grounds for deportability 
and inadmissibility is that to be deportable a noncitizen must have been con-
victed of the offense, whereas to be inadmissible a noncitizen need only admit 
to committing the offense or give the immigration authorities “reason to be-
lieve” that he or she committed the offense.97 Because the INA defines the 
term “conviction” broadly, however, a variety of criminal dispositions can make 
an LPR deportable.98 A noncitizen has been convicted if: (1) a judge or jury 
makes a formal finding of guilt; (2) the noncitizen pleads guilty or nolo conten-
dere; or (3) the noncitizen admits enough facts to warrant a guilty finding.99 
When a noncitizen engages in behavior that constitutes a deportability or 
inadmissibility ground, however, it does not automatically mean that the 
noncitizen cannot enter or stay in the country.100 Rather, the INA sets forth var-
ious forms of relief, both mandatory and discretionary.101 Some criminal ac-
tivity, however, may preclude noncitizens from establishing their eligibility for 
relief.102 
                                                                                                                      
[https://perma.cc/U87Y-ZP9X]). “Moral turpitude” tends to reflect the “changing norms of behavior,” 
and, as such, courts have adopted several different definitions of the phrase. Id. The Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA), an administrative body that adjudicates immigration proceedings, defined 
moral turpitude as “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or de-
praved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons and to society 
in general.” In re Zaragoza-Vaquero, 26 I. & N. Dec. 814, 815 (BIA 2016). The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, defined a crime involving moral turpitude as either a 
crime “involving fraud” or a crime “involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.” Ortega-Lopez v. 
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Robles-Urrea v. Lynch, 678 F.3d 702, 708 (9th 
Cir. 2012)). Despite the lack of a uniform definition, the Supreme Court held in Jordan v. De George 
that the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” was not “void for vagueness.” 341 U.S. 223, 230, 
231–32 (1951); see Vagueness Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 60 (stating that the 
doctrine, which is based on the Due Process Clause, requires a criminal statute to “explicitly and defi-
nitely” provide the acts it prohibits “so as to provide fair warning and preclude arbitrary enforce-
ment”). 
 97 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 7; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C) (providing that “[a]ny alien 
who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe . . . is or has been an 
illicit trafficker in any controlled substance . . . is inadmissible” (emphasis added)). 
 98 Cunnings, supra note 36, at 532; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (defining the term “conviction” 
as “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been with-
held where . . . a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and . . . the judge has 
ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed”). 
 99 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). A plea of nolo contendere, loosely translated to “no contest,” is a 
plea in which the defendant “admits guilt for all purposes.” Nolo Contendere, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 60. 
 100 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 13. 
 101 Id. The authority to grant relief typically belongs to either the Attorney General and, by way of 
delegation, the EOIR or USCIS. Id. Specifically, EOIR adjudicates applications for relief, whereas 
USCIS adjudicates applications for immigration benefits. Id. Examples of relief include, but are not 
limited to, “cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, withholding of removal, and asylum.” Id. 
 102 Id. Through cancellation of removal, the Attorney General can cancel the removal of LPRs 
who are either deportable or inadmissible under immigration law and who qualify for relief. Id. To be 
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Finally, LPRs may naturalize after living in the country continuously for a 
period of five years, in addition to satisfying a number of other requirements.103 
One such requirement is that LPRs possess good moral character for at least the 
five-year period leading up to their application for U.S. citizenship.104 DOJ regu-
lations require that a good moral character determination consider the “standards 
of the average citizen in the community of residence.”105 The INA goes one step 
further, setting forth a non-exhaustive list of conduct that would disqualify a 
noncitizen from demonstrating good moral character.106 
C. Access to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”107 Nevertheless, defendants were historically not entitled to court-
                                                                                                                      
eligible for cancellation of removal, an LPR must have: (1) at least five years of lawful permanent 
residence in the United States; (2) seven years of continuous lawful residence in the United States 
after having been lawfully admitted in any immigration status; and (3) no aggravated felony convic-
tions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). “Aggravated felonies” are not simply offenses that are punishable as felo-
nies; certain misdemeanors are considered aggravated felonies for immigration purposes as well. 
PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10; see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (listing various aggravated felonies). 
Over time, Congress has consistently expanded the list of aggravated felonies to reach additional 
crimes. PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 10. Moreover, a grant of cancellation of removal is discre-
tionary, and, although an applicant need not show a particular degree of hardship, an Immigration 
Judge will balance the factors that reflect negatively on the noncitizen’s desirability as an LPR with 
those that reflect positively. GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, § 64.04 (citing In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. 
Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998)). The BIA stated that factors that favor a grant of cancellation of removal in-
clude family ties, length of residence in the country, military service, employment, and community 
service. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11. By contrast, adverse factors include criminal history and 
the nature of the conduct at issue. Id. Applicants have the burden of demonstrating that they deserve 
an exercise of discretion in their favor. GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, § 64.04. 
 103 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 22. 
 104 Id. at 22–23. 
 105 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2) (2020). Good moral character does not, however, require “moral ex-
cellence,” and one incident will not necessarily preclude a finding of it. In re Sanchez-Linn, 20 I. & N. 
Dec. 362, 366 (BIA 1991) (citing In re B-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 611 (BIA 1943)). 
 106 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 23. The DHS also promulgated a regulation providing its 
own list of criminal activity that would inhibit a finding of good moral character. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 316.10(b). There is some overlap between the criminal activities listed in the INA and those the 
DHS set forth. PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 23 n.138. 
 107 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is well established that “the right to counsel is the right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added). 
In Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court established the standard for evaluating claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the defendant first must demonstrate that counsel was “deficient.” Id. In other words, the 
defendant must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, the defendant must demon-
strate prejudice. Id. Specifically, the defendant must show that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Id. Notably, because the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective 
assistance counsel is limited to criminal defendants, and deportation is considered a civil rather than a 
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appointed counsel for misdemeanor offenses.108 In 1972, in Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, the Supreme Court expanded the class of persons entitled to court-appointed 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.109 Specifically, the Court held that indigent 
defendants charged with misdemeanor offenses are equally deserving of repre-
sentation.110 The Court’s holding, however, was subject to an important limita-
tion: it was only afforded to defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment.111 
Shortly thereafter in Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in 
Argersinger, stating that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of assistance of coun-
sel extends only to those defendants who are actually sentenced to a term of im-
prisonment, rather than those who merely faced the possibility.112 
                                                                                                                      
criminal penalty, noncitizens facing removal are not entitled to court-appointed counsel in immigra-
tion court. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNS., ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMI-
GRATION COURT 1 (2016), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
access_to_counsel_in_immigration_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN5F-G86D]. 
 108 See Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 753 
(2017) (noting that, before 1972, courts interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing the right to court-
appointed counsel for felony offenses only). 
 109 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the defendant was charged with “carry-
ing a concealed weapon” in Florida, an offense that carried with it a prison sentence of up to six 
months, a fine of one thousand dollars, or a combination of the two. Id. at 26. Argersinger, who was 
not represented by counsel, was sentenced to ninety days in jail. Id. He subsequently brought a habeas 
corpus action before the Florida Supreme Court, claiming that he was denied his right to counsel un-
der the Sixth Amendment. Id. The Florida Supreme Court, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968), held that only defendants facing trial for 
“non-petty offenses” punishable by a prison sentence of six months or more have a right to court-
appointed counsel. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26–27. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a 
person cannot be imprisoned for any offense, regardless of its severity, without having been represent-
ed at trial. Id. at 37. This does not apply, however, where there has been a “knowing and intelligent 
waiver.” Id. 
 110 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36–37. 
 111 See id. at 37 (“We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the 
right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail.”). 
 112 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979). In Scott v. Illinois, the defendant was convicted 
of theft for shoplifting merchandise worth under one hundred and fifty dollars. Id. at 368. The relevant 
Illinois statute provided that the maximum penalty for a shoplifting offense was a five-hundred-dollar 
fine, a one-year prison sentence or, alternatively, both a fine and imprisonment. Id. Although the de-
fendant was merely sentenced to pay a fifty-dollar fine, he contended that he was entitled to court-
appointed counsel because state law authorized a penalty of imprisonment. Id. at 368–69. The Su-
preme Court of Illinois dismissed this argument, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Arger-
singer. Id. at 369. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that it was not required to apply 
Argersinger where a defendant was charged with an offense for which imprisonment was authorized 
but not actually imposed. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Constitution does not 
compel a state trial court to provide court-appointed counsel to a defendant under these circumstances. 
Id. Notably, Justice Brennan, in his dissent, vehemently rejected the majority’s “actual imprisonment” 
standard. Id. at 381–82 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In doing so, Justice Brennan noted that the author-
ized penalty, rather than the actual penalty, serves as a “better predictor of the stigma and other collat-
eral consequences that attach to conviction of an offense.” Id. at 382. Scholars have reiterated and 
expanded on Justice Brennan’s concerns with the “actual imprisonment” standard. See, e.g., B. Mitch-
ell Simpson III, A Fair Trial: Are Indigents Charged with Misdemeanors Entitled to Court Appointed 
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The Supreme Court’s holdings in Argersinger and Scott set the minimum 
requirements for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.113 Although states are 
free to afford greater protections, several states have elected not to do so, limit-
ing the right to counsel only to those required by the U.S. Constitution.114 
Notably, the Supreme Court’s holdings in both Argersinger and Scott ap-
ply to all criminal defendants, irrespective of their immigration status.115 As 
such, in states that limit the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to that which 
the U.S. Constitution requires, indigent, noncitizen defendants who are not 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment are not entitled to have counsel appointed 
in their defense, irrespective of the immigration consequences they are likely 
to face as a result.116 
Moreover, even those indigent, noncitizen defendants who were able to 
obtain counsel have historically received limited assistance, as the majority of 
federal and state courts held that there is no requirement that defense attorneys 
advise their clients of the immigration consequences of criminal convic-
tions.117 This meant, for example, that defense attorneys could recommend ac-
                                                                                                                      
Counsel?, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 417, 435 (2000) (noting the impracticability of requiring 
trial judges to determine what the sentence will be before the trial has even taken place). 
 113 Simpson, supra note 112, at 418; see also Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Conse-
quences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 585, 586–87, 594 (2011) (noting that Scott’s holding left it up to the states to 
determine whether indigent defendants facing relatively minor charges would receive court-appointed 
counsel). 
 114 Simpson, supra note 112, at 426; see, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 6.1 (2020) (providing that an 
indigent defendant is “entitled to have an attorney appointed . . . in all criminal proceedings in which 
representation by counsel is constitutionally required” (emphasis added)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10 
(2020) (“Any person entitled to counsel under the Constitution of the United States shall be so advised 
and if it is determined that the person is financially unable to retain counsel then counsel shall be 
provided upon order of the appropriate judge unless such person voluntarily and intelligently waives 
his right thereto.”). But see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 11-2602 (2021) (providing the right to court-appointed 
counsel “[i]n all cases where a person faces a loss of liberty” (emphasis added)). 
 115 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74 (holding that the Sixth Amendment provides that indigent crim-
inal defendants cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment if the State did not provide them with 
the right to appointed counsel); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37 (holding that people cannot be imprisoned 
unless they were represented by counsel at trial, with the exception of cases in which the defendant 
has knowingly and intelligently waived that right). 
 116 See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–74; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
 117 Cunnings, supra note 36, at 538; see Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342, 350–51 (2013) 
(noting that all ten federal appellate courts that considered the issue, as well as the appellate courts of 
just under thirty states, had determined that an attorney’s failure to advise a client of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea does not constitute a Sixth Amendment violation). Only two state courts 
held that failing to caution a client regarding the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, including 
deportation, constituted a Sixth Amendment violation. Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 351; see State v. Paredez, 
101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004) (holding that, like affirmative misrepresentation, an attorney’s failure 
to advise his or her client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is “deficient”); People v. 
Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) (stating that it is reasonable to require a defense attorney to 
research relevant immigration law when he or she knows that the client is a noncitizen because “attor-
neys must inform themselves of material legal principles that may significantly impact the particular 
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cepting a plea agreement without alerting their clients to the possibility of de-
portation.118 This was due, at least in part, to the fact that the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel is limited to the criminal law context, 
from which the American immigration system is distinct.119 
This all changed with the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. 
Kentucky.120 Jose Padilla, a Honduras native, had maintained LPR status for 
over forty years.121 After pleading guilty to “misdemeanor possession of mari-
juana[,] misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia[, and] felony traffick-
ing [of over five pounds] in marijuana,” Padilla, who was represented by coun-
sel at the time, faced the very realistic possibility of deportation.122 In a post-
                                                                                                                      
circumstances of their clients”). The Supreme Court of New Mexico, for example, declined to distin-
guish between “misadvice and non-advice.” Paredez, 103 P.3d at 804. Specifically, the court reasoned 
that both have the same result—regardless of whether an attorney provides a general warning that a 
guilty plea “could” impact immigration status or no advice at all, the defendant is left with incomplete 
information to an informed decision as to whether to plead guilty. Id. at 804–05. Additionally, the 
court noted that creating such a distinction would incentivize attorneys not to provide advice regarding 
immigration consequences because, if inaccurate, they could be found “ineffective.” Id. at 805. Final-
ly, the court emphasized that not requiring attorneys to advise their clients of the immigration conse-
quences of pleading guilty would force their clients to determine these consequences themselves. Id. 
This is troubling, the court reasoned, because clients are undoubtedly less qualified to recognize these 
complex legal issues than their attorneys. Id. 
 118 Cunnings, supra note 36, at 538. 
 119 Id. at 539; see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (stating that although deporta-
tion is “intimately related” to the criminal process, “it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction”). As 
such, although immigrants have a right to counsel in immigration court, they must bear the cost. EA-
GLY & SHAFER, supra note 107, at 1; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (providing that “the alien shall 
have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by . . . counsel . . . as the 
alien shall choose”). This has meant that a mere 37% of immigrants obtain legal representation to 
assist in their removal proceedings. EAGLY & SHAFER, supra note 107, at 1–2 (relying on data from 
more than 1.2 million deportation proceedings adjudicated between 2007 and 2012). Immigrants in 
detention fared even worse—only 14% of detained immigrants secured legal counsel. See id. at 2. 
These statistics are significant because non-detained, represented immigrants were almost five times 
more likely to obtain a favorable outcome than their unrepresented counterparts. Id. at 3. Similarly, 
detained, represented immigrants were nearly two times as likely as detained, unrepresented immi-
grants to obtain the relief they desired. Id. 
 120 See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences 
at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 675 (2011) (stating that Padilla’s holding alone solidifies its charac-
terization as a “landmark” decision). See generally Padilla, 559 U.S. 356. 
 121 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. Padilla, who had served in the military during the Vietnam War, 
lived with his wife, three disabled children, and elderly mother-in-law in California. Padilla v. Com-
monwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). He also had three adult children. Id. 
 122 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (No. 08-651). In addition to the three 
drug-related offenses, DHS had also charged Padilla, who had a valid Commercial Driver’s License in 
Nevada, with “failing to have a weight and distance tax number . . . on his truck.” Id. at 2–3. It was 
this truck that he used to haul nearly one thousand pounds of marijuana. Id. at 2. Padilla pleaded guilty 
to the three drug-related charges in exchange for the dismissal of the charge for operating a tractor 
trailer without a weight and distance tax number. Id. at 3. The plea agreement stipulated that Padilla 
would serve five years of his ten-year sentence and would be subject to probation for the remaining five. 
Id. Soon after Padilla entered the plea, he received an immigration detainer. Id.; see Q&A: U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement Declined Detainer Outcome Report (DDOR), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
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conviction proceeding, Padilla asserted that his attorney improperly assured 
him that he “did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been 
in the country so long.”123 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied post-
conviction relief, concluding that the Sixth Amendment does not shield crimi-
nal defendants from incorrect advice about the possibility of deportation. 124 
The court reasoned that deportation is a mere “collateral” consequence of a 
criminal conviction.125 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether federal law 
required Padilla’s counsel to warn his client that pleading guilty could result in 
deportation.126 The Court found for Padilla, holding that noncitizen criminal 
                                                                                                                      
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/03/20/qa-us-immigration-and-customers-enforcement-declined-
detainer-outcome-report [https://perma.cc/56FK-JZLT] (describing an ICE detainer as a means of 
informing federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies of its intent to detain a noncitizen and request-
ing that the agency notify ICE before releasing him or her from criminal custody). The detainer listed 
Padilla’s three drug-related charges as deportable offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which, as 
the Court noted, is the deportation ground for “virtually every drug offense except for only the most 
insignificant marijuana offenses.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 n.1; see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any 
alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt 
to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a con-
trolled substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams 
or less of marijuana, is deportable.”). 
 123 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359 (explaining that Padilla’s counsel’s wrongdoing went beyond 
simply failing to advise him of the adverse consequences of pleading guilty to the charges he was 
facing). The language of the plea agreement validated Padilla’s understanding that the guilty plea 
would not impact his immigration status. Petition for Writ Certiorari, supra note 122, at 3. Indeed, one 
of the conditions of the agreement was that Padilla would remain in Hardin County, Kentucky while 
he was on probation. Id. 
 124 See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359–60. 
 125 See id. (noting that it was immaterial whether Padilla’s counsel affirmatively provided incor-
rect advice about the possibility of deportation or whether he failed to advise him about the possibility 
at all, as neither would provide a basis for relief). Collateral consequences are those that fall outside 
the state trial court’s sentencing authority. Id. at 364. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Kentucky con-
cluded that under the Sixth Amendment counsel is not required to advise its clients of consequences 
over which the state trial court has no authority. Id. at 365. In other words, the client does not have a 
valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel fails to advise the defendant of possi-
ble deportation consequences. Id. Numerous other courts had previously come to the same conclusion. 
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2000) (affirming prior decisions 
barring ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel’s failure to advise a client of the 
immigration consequences of a guilty plea), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; Commonwealth v. 
Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (Pa. 1989) (holding that counsel does not need to advise a client who is 
considering pleading guilty of the collateral consequences of doing so to provide adequate assistance), 
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356. Other examples of collateral consequences include, but are not 
limited to, revocation of a driver’s license, required registration with local governments after a sex 
crime conviction, ineligibility for public benefits, and prohibition on gun possession. AM. BAR ASS’N 
CRIM. JUST. SECTION, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS JUDICIAL BENCH 
BOOK: THE NATIONAL INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 6–
7 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251583.pdf [https://perma.cc/4L5P-AS6P]. 
 126 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. In his petition for certiorari, Padilla asked the Court to consider two 
questions: (1) whether the mandatory deportation that results from pleading guilty to trafficking in 
marijuana is a “collateral consequence” that absolves a defense attorney of the duty to “investigate 
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defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to complete and accurate advice 
from their defense attorneys regarding the potential immigration consequences 
of a criminal conviction.127 The Court limited its holding, however, by stating 
that a Sixth Amendment violation only occurs where the immigration conse-
quences are clear.128 Where the immigration consequences are not clear, a 
criminal defense attorney is simply required to advise their client that the crim-
inal charges he or she is facing may carry unfavorable immigration conse-
quences, without specifically outlining what those might be.129 
Notably, the Court did not delineate which categories of criminal charges 
result in sufficiently clear immigration consequences so as to require a higher 
standard of advice from criminal defense attorneys.130 What was clear from the 
decision, however, is that a noncitizen charged with marijuana possession im-
plicates objectively clear immigration consequences.131 The consequences are 
clear because, according to the INA, a noncitizen who has been convicted of a 
controlled substance offense, other than possession of thirty grams or less of 
marijuana for one’s own use, is deportable.132 Thus, a noncitizen charged with 
possession of marijuana is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to legal advice 
pertaining to the potential immigration consequences of the charge.133 
                                                                                                                      
and advise,” and (2) assuming that mandatory deportation is considered a “collateral consequence,” 
whether a defense attorney’s “gross misadvice” on the matter is sufficient justification for casting 
aside a guilty plea that was entered into in reliance on that advise. Petition for Writ Certiorari, supra 
note 122, at i. 
 127 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360, 366. Despite being a victory for immigrant rights advocates, Padilla 
has garnered criticism as well. See Cunnings, supra note 36, at 538 (referring to Padilla as a “ground-
breaking” decision that “changed the doctrinal landscape significantly for noncitizens charged with 
crimes”). But see Chin, supra note 120, at 678 (noting that, even before Padilla, public defenders 
were already considerably overworked). 
 128 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. The Court reasoned that immigration law is particularly complex, 
and many criminal defense attorneys, irrespective of whether they practice in state or federal court, 
may not be familiar with it. Id. 
 129 Id. In his concurrence, Justice Alito expressed concern with setting forth a rule that hinges on 
determining whether the law is “succinct and straightforward.” See id. at 375 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the “vague, halfway test will lead to much confusion and needless litigation”). 
 130 Cunnings, supra note 36, at 540–41 (noting that doing so would be extremely difficult because 
different offenses result in different immigration consequences depending on a wide variety of fac-
tors). 
 131 Id. at 541. The Court in Padilla held that Padilla’s counsel could have readily discovered, by 
simply reading the text of the statute, whether the conviction would render him deportable. 559 U.S. 
at 368. Notably, some scholars contend that the statute in question, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), is not 
quite so clear. See, e.g., Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the Circumstances: Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excus-
es Fundamental Fairness and Leaves Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 
57 (2012) (setting forth a list of determinations Padilla’s attorney would have had to make before even 
getting to the statute). 
 132 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i); see Cunnings, supra note 36, at 541 (noting that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) is implicated by the majority of minor marijuana offenses). 
 133 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 360. 
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The Supreme Court reasoned that its holding would benefit both the 
noncitizen defendant and the State, as information regarding the possibility of 
deportation can help reach mutually beneficial agreements.134 For example, 
where criminal behavior provides the basis for multiple charges, of which only 
a portion require deportation post-conviction, a defense attorney who possess-
es at least a cursory understanding of the intersection between criminal and 
immigration law may be able to obtain a plea agreement that minimizes the 
likelihood of deportation by avoiding convictions for offenses that automati-
cally prompt removal proceedings.135 Additionally, the possibility of deporta-
tion may encourage a noncitizen defendant to plead guilty to an offense that 
does not compel that result in exchange for the dropping of a charge that does, 
thus serving the State’s interest in judicial economy as well.136 
II. IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF MARIJUANA-BASED OFFENSES AND 
THE IMPACT OF MARIJUANA DECRIMINALIZATION ON LPRS 
Although U.S. citizens charged with marijuana possession face increas-
ingly lighter penalties, LPRs do not share in the good fortune—a marijuana 
possession charge can still lead to severe immigration consequences.137 Section 
A of this Part describes the various ways marijuana-related convictions can 
impact LPRs.138 Section B of this Part demonstrates that LPRs residing in 
states that have decriminalized the drug may be even more likely to face ad-
verse immigration consequences.139 
A. Immigration Consequences of Marijuana-Related  
Criminal Convictions for LPRs 
Although many states have recognized that marijuana has some medicinal 
value, as well as a low likelihood of abuse, convictions for marijuana-related 
offenses can still have adverse immigration consequences for LPRs.140 For ex-
                                                                                                                      
 134 Id. at 373. 
 135 Id. For example, prosecutors could permit a noncitizen defendant to plead guilty to disorderly 
conduct rather than marijuana possession. Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in 
Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1773 (2013). Similarly, a criminal defense attorney 
may be able to negotiate changes to the quantity of drugs charged in a way that minimizes the immi-
gration consequences of the charge. Id. at 1774. 
 136 Padilla, 559 U.S. at 373. Prosecutors also benefit significantly from negotiating plea deals 
because trials require more time and effort and involve more uncertainty as well. Cade, supra note 
135, at 1773. 
 137 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a noncitizen who is convicted of violat-
ing a state or federal law “relating to a controlled substance” is deportable). 
 138 See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 160–171 and accompanying text. 
 140 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a noncitizen who is convicted of violating a 
state or federal law “relating to a controlled substance” is deportable); Calandrillo & Fulton, supra 
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ample, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 lays out the types of offenses that make a noncitizen 
deportable.141 Under § 1227(a)(2)(B), an LPR convicted of violating a state or 
federal law “relating to a controlled substance” is deportable.142 The statute 
adopts the same definition of “controlled substance” as the CSA and, as a re-
sult, marijuana is considered a controlled substance for immigration purposes 
as well.143 The statute does, however, contain a personal-use exception that 
provides that noncitizens convicted of a “single offense involving possession 
for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana” are not deportable.144 
Marijuana-related offenses can also have implications beyond deporta-
tion—they can make LPRs inadmissible.145 An LPR convicted of violating a 
federal, state, or foreign controlled substance law is inadmissible.146 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                      
note 30, at 210 (describing the various medicinal benefits of marijuana). Indeed, between 2007 and 
2012, the United States deported over 34,000 people whose worst conviction was for marijuana pos-
session. Christie Thompson, Get Caught with Pot, Face Deportation, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 16, 
2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/16/get-caught-with-pot-face-deportation [https://
perma.cc/5E5R-HHCR]. 
 141 8 U.S.C. § 1227. 
 142 Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The statute in full states that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admis-
sion has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation 
of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . other than a 
single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deporta-
ble.” Id. Thus, this deportability ground requires that the statute under which the noncitizen is con-
victed “relat[e] to” a controlled substance, rather than that the criminal act involve a controlled sub-
stance. See id. (emphasis added) (providing that a noncitizen who has been convicted of violating a 
law “relating to a controlled substance” is deportable); see also GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, 
§ 71.05 (highlighting the significance of the “relating to” language). Drug paraphernalia laws are 
illustrative of this difference. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, § 71.05. In 2015, the Supreme Court 
clarified that drug paraphernalia statutes typically do not “relat[e] to” a controlled substance unless an 
element of the crime is linked to a drug specifically defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Mellouli v. Lynch, 
135 S. Ct. 1980, 1990–91 (2015); see GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, § 71.05 (explaining the Court’s 
holding in Mellouli). Notably, even if it is possible for noncitizens to avoid a conviction for a con-
trolled substance violation, they must also avoid the consequences of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
which states than noncitizens are deportable for becoming a drug addict or a drug abuser at any point 
after admission. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 96, § 71.05 (noting that this deportability ground is 
the only drug-related ground for which a noncitizen can be deported without committing a crime). 
 143 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (stating that 21 U.S.C. § 802, one section of the CSA, defines 
the term “controlled substance[s]”); 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (listing marijuana as a controlled substance 
under the CSA). 
 144 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B). 
 145 See id. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (“An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the Unit-
ed States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into the United States for purposes of the 
immigration laws unless the alien . . . has committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this 
title, unless since such offense the alien has been granted relief under section 1182(h) or 1229b(a) of 
this title . . . .”); id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having commit-
ted, or who admits committing acts with constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of . . . any 
law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance 
. . . is inadmissible.”). 
 146 Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
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an LPR who admits to committing a controlled substance violation, or the es-
sential elements of a controlled substance violation, is inadmissible as well.147 
Additionally, marijuana-related offenses may bar an LPR from establish-
ing eligibility for cancellation of removal, one of several forms of discretion-
ary relief.148 This is because LPRs are ineligible for cancellation of removal if 
they have been convicted of an aggravated felony.149 The INA defines the term 
“aggravated felony” by listing crimes categorized as such.150 One such crime is 
“illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.”151 Because the INA defines the 
term “aggravated felony” broadly, a misdemeanor drug charge for which a 
one-year prison sentence is authorized can qualify as an aggravated felony. 152 
Finally, marijuana-related offenses may hinder LPRs from naturalizing.153 
To establish eligibility for naturalization, LPRs must demonstrate good moral 
character for a statutorily provided period of time.154 LPRs who violate a fed-
eral or state law pertaining to controlled substances during the statutory period 
will be unable to demonstrate good moral character.155 Stated another way, a 
                                                                                                                      
 147 Id. 
 148 PECK & SMITH, supra note 77, at 15. Other forms of relief include adjustment of status, volun-
tary departure, withholding of removal, and asylum. Id. at 13. 
 149 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (providing that to qualify for withholding of removal, an LPR 
must not have been convicted of an aggravated felony). 
 150 Id. § 1101(a)(43). Crimes that qualify as an aggravated felony include: murder, rape, sexual 
abuse of a minor, money laundering, and any offense related to firearms or explosive materials. Id. An 
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes qualifies as an aggravated felony as well. Id. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(U). 
 151 See id. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (listing “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in 
section 802 of [the CSA]), including a drug trafficking crime” as an aggravated felony); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 802(6) (defining the term “controlled substance”). A “drug trafficking crime” is defined as a felony 
punishable under the CSA. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). A “felony” is a crime for which a term of impris-
onment of more than one year is authorized. Id. § 3559(a). 
 152 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felony). Recognizing the lack of proportion-
ality that exists where a noncitizen is deported for marijuana possession, some states have enacted 
laws reducing the maximum punishment for misdemeanors by a single day. See Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice in an Era of Mass Deportation: Reforms from California, 20 NEW CRIM. L.R. 12, 29 
(2017) (describing California’s law redefining “misdemeanor”). For example, the California legisla-
ture amended the California Penal Code to provide that the maximum term of imprisonment for mis-
demeanor offenses is 364 days instead of the prior 365-day maximum. Id. The legislature recognized 
that, in many instances, deportation is implicated by a conviction of a crime for which a sentence of 
one year or longer is either feasible or imposed. See id. at 30 (noting that the term of imprisonment is 
critical not only for determining whether an offense is an “aggravated felony” but also whether it is a 
“crime of moral turpitude”). 
 153 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (stating that “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person 
of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be es-
tablished,” committed one of the listed acts); BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra note 10, at 8 
(describing the “good moral character” eligibility requirement for naturalization). 
 154 See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (stating that to naturalize, an applicant must have demonstrated good 
moral character for a period of five years). 
 155 Id. § 1101(f) (stating that “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good 
moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established,” 
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controlled substance violation, if committed during a particular period of time, 
serves as a bar to establishing good moral character.156 There is, however, an 
exception: the bar to establishing good moral character does not apply if the 
violation is for a single possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana.157 No-
tably, even if a criminal disposition can be manipulated so as to avoid a finding 
of one of the conditional bars to establishing good moral character, DHS, in its 
discretion, can still find that a person does not have the requisite good moral 
character.158 Because states are trending toward legalizing marijuana, the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) published guidance in April 
2019 clarifying that a CSA violation for marijuana-based offenses is still a 
conditional bar to establishing good moral character despite changing state 
laws.159 
B. The Impact of Marijuana Decriminalization on LPRs 
Although most Americans stand to benefit from the states’ decriminaliza-
tion of marijuana, LPRs may actually be disadvantaged by it.160 First, in states 
that have decriminalized, or even legalized, marijuana, LPRs may mistakenly 
believe that they can disclose marijuana use to DHS employees or other law 
enforcement personnel without consequence.161 This, of course, is incorrect—
                                                                                                                      
committed one of several listed acts); 12 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., USCIS POLICY MAN-
UAL (2021), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-f-chapter-5 [https://perma.cc/
RL92-CXCH] [hereinafter USCIS POLICY MANUAL]. Moreover, LPRs who conspire to violate, or aid 
and abet another person to violate, such laws cannot establish good moral character either. USCIS 
POLICY MANUAL, supra. 
 156 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (providing that it is illegal for a “person [to] 
knowingly or intentionally . . . manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) (defining “manu-
facture” as “the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a drug or other 
substance”); id. § 802(22) (defining “production” as “the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, 
or harvesting of a controlled substance”). 
 157 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3). 
 158 See In re Turcotte, 12 I. & N. Dec. 206, 208 (BIA 1967) (stating that the granting of discre-
tionary relief is a “privilege” that is afforded to the applicant only where appropriate, rather than “an 
automatic act conditioned solely upon a showing of statutory eligibility”). 
 159 U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Policy Alert on Controlled Substance-Related Activity 
and Good Moral Character Determinations, PA-2019-02 (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/
sites/default/files/policymanual/updates/20190419-ControlledSubstanceViolations.pdf [https://perma.
cc/T4PF-T4A7]. 
 160 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having 
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation 
of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a for-
eign country related to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.”); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing 
that “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or 
regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance . . . is 
deportable”). 
 161 BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra note 10, at 4. One popular way of helping to prevent 
this is simply to warn LPRs about the state of the law. See id. at 5 (providing that “[e]ducation is the 
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such an admission can have a disastrous impact on an LPR’s immigration sta-
tus.162 Indeed, a mere admission is sufficient to trigger the inadmissibility 
ground.163 
Moreover, the INA bars an LPR who engages in marijuana-based offenses 
from establishing good, moral character and, significantly, LPRs have ample 
opportunity to admit as much.164 For example, to naturalize, an LPR must take 
part in an interview with USCIS officers during which the officers ask ques-
tions touching on all aspects of the naturalization process.165 In doing so, offic-
ers ask the applicants about their criminal history and moral character, among a 
number of other topics.166 In response, applicants are eagerly admitting to ma-
rijuana use, believing that it is entirely lawful to do so.167 Additionally, USCIS 
is reportedly establishing systems to ensure that its agents are capturing these 
admissions from applicants.168 
                                                                                                                      
very best defense”); see, e.g., Know Your Rights—Marijuana Use in Illinois, ACLU ILL., https://www.
aclu-il.org/en/know-your-rights/know-your-rights-marijuana-use-illinois [https://perma.cc/LA9J-
V5EV] (advising noncitizens to consult an immigration attorney before buying marijuana). 
 162 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (“[A]ny alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, 
or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of . . . a violation of (or a con-
spiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance . . . is inadmissible.”). 
 163 See id. As such, LPRs can only admit to using medical marijuana if they do not plan to travel 
outside of the United States or apply for U.S. citizenship. BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra 
note 10, at 5. The story of one man, who the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program permitted 
to live and work in the United States, made news when he left the country for Mexico to secure his green 
card. Rob McMillan, Corona Man Seeking Citizenship Not Allowed into U.S. After Admitting to Using 
Marijuana, ABC 7 (July 31, 2019), https://abc7.com/society/ie-man-seeking-citizenship-remains-in-
mexico-after-admitting-marijuana-use-/5431161/ [https://perma.cc/96GF-UK4Y]. Because he admit-
ted to smoking marijuana, he was not only told that he could not re-enter the country but that he was 
ineligible to receive a visa as well. Id. 
 164 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (stating that “[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person 
of good moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be es-
tablished,” committed one of several listed acts); id. § 1427(a) (stating that to naturalize, an applicant 
must have demonstrated good moral character for a period of five years). 
 165 USCIS POLICY MANUAL, supra note 155, pt. B, ch. 3. 
 166 Id. Other topics include: any absences from the United States after obtaining LPR status; 
knowledge of U.S. history and government; understanding of and commitment to the principles of the 
U.S. Constitution; membership in particular organizations; and willingness to take an “Oath of Alle-
giance” to the country. Id. In the interview, an applicant may, but need not, be accompanied by an 
attorney. Id. 
 167 BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra note 10, at 8. Similarly, immigration officials are 
asking noncitizens about their participation in the marijuana industry in states or countries where it is 
legal. John Quinn, Link to Marijuana Industry as Basis for Denial of Naturalization Application?, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/link-to-marijuana-industry-
basis-denial-naturalization-application [https://perma.cc/WBR4-TURX]. In Colorado, where marijua-
na is legal for both medicinal and recreational use, USCIS denied two immigrants’ naturalization 
applications because it found that they lacked good moral character after discovering they were em-
ployed in the marijuana industry. Id. 
 168 BRADY, NIGHTINGALE & ADAMS, supra note 10, at 8; see also Ana Campoy & Justin 
Rohrlich, Immigrants Are Being Denied US Citizenship for Smoking Legal Pot, QUARTZ (Apr. 20, 
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Second, although the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky attempted to ensure that noncitizens would receive complete and accu-
rate advice regarding the potential immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty, the decriminalization of marijuana may mean that many indigent LPRs 
will not receive any advice at all.169 This is because in states that provide noth-
ing more than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, criminal defendants, irre-
spective of their immigration status, will not be appointed public defenders 
unless a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.170 As more and more states de-
criminalize marijuana, such that imprisonment is no longer a possibility, 
noncitizen criminal defendants will be less likely to receive critical advice re-
garding the severe immigration consequences of pleading guilty to seemingly 
minor offenses.171 
III. FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL SOLUTIONS 
Proportionality is inherently lacking where an LPR is found deportable 
for low-level offenses such as marijuana possession.172 Although the federal 
government has the authority to address this issue, it has historically failed to 
do so.173 As such, states have had to step in, implementing a range of measures 
                                                                                                                      
2019), https://qz.com/1600262/immigrants-are-being-denied-us-citizenship-for-smoking-legal-pot/ 
[https://perma.cc/7FKJ-73G7] (noting that the most straightforward way for USCIS to find out if 
applicants have used drugs is simply to ask). 
 169 Cunnings, supra note 36, at 545. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that some defendants 
waive their right to attorney, assuming that marijuana possession charges are “as minor as a traffic 
ticket.” Thompson, supra note 140. 
 170 See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires 
only that no indigent criminal defendant be forced to serve time in prison unless the state has appoint-
ed him or her counsel). 
 171 See id.; Cunnings, supra note 36, at 545; see also Terry Carter, Virginia Court’s No-Jail Poli-
cy for Marijuana Possession Could Have Consequences for Immigrants, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Mar. 13, 
2017), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/virginia_courts_no-jail_policy_for_marijuana_
possession_could_have_conseque [https://perma.cc/7AQD-AUMF] (noting that the Arlington General 
District Court’s new policy of not seeking jail time for possession of limited amounts of marijuana is 
“rubb[ing] up against tough immigration laws enacted years ago”); Rachel Weiner, Get Caught with 
Pot, Don’t Go to Jail: Why Not Everyone Is Happy, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/get-caught-with-pot-dont-go-to-jail-why-not-everyone-is-
happy/2017/03/09/81c0e6a6-fecb-11e6-8ebe-6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html [https://perma.cc/58RJ-342B] 
(stating that Arlington County, Virginia’s policy that those found possessing small amounts of mariju-
ana for the first time will not face jail time “could have dire consequences for immigrants, both legal 
and undocumented”). 
 172 See Cunnings, supra note 36, at 517 (arguing that the harsh penalties imposed on those con-
victed of marijuana possession “violate principles of proportionality and justice that should be guiding 
our nation’s immigration policies”). The concept of proportionality, which is rooted in the Eighth 
Amendment, is the idea that “punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] 
offense.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 
367 (1910) (alteration in original)). 
 173 See Ford, supra note 48, at 676 (noting that the federal government remains committed to 
categorizing marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the CSA). 
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designed to address the issue.174 Section A of this Part describes these measures, 
arguing in favor of those that go so far as to provide direct representation to 
noncitizen defendants charged with minor offenses.175 Section B of this Part 
describes one of the more recent attempts at descheduling marijuana at the 
federal level and notes that, given the Democratic Party’s control of both the 
House and Senate, its passage has become a realistic possibility.176 
A. Cities and States Attempt to Compensate for the  
Federal Government’s Shortcomings 
States have attempted to limit the immigration consequences of low-level 
marijuana offenses in various ways.177 New York, for example, dedicated funds 
toward providing legal services providers with the support necessary to advise 
their noncitizen clients as to the potential immigration consequences of a crim-
inal conviction.178 In order to do so, the state created the country’s first state-
wide system of immigration assistance centers to educate criminal and family 
court lawyers about immigration law.179 The six Regional Immigration Assis-
tance Centers located throughout the state are responsible for helping attorneys 
and other legal services providers develop strategies for limiting or eliminating 
the threat of removal.180 
                                                                                                                      
 174 See infra notes 177–193 and accompanying text. 
 175 See infra notes 177–193 and accompanying text. 
 176 See infra notes 194–203 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Kendra Sena, State Criminal Law and Immigration: How State Criminal-Justice Systems 
Can Cause Deportations, or Limit Them, ALBANY L. SCH. 1, 2–4, https://www.albanylaw.edu/centers/
government-law-center/Immigration/explainers/Documents/State-Criminal-Law-and-Immigration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4WDW-4TEG] (May 6, 2019) (describing different measures states have taken to 
address this issue). One example is pardons. Id. at 3. For many crimes, a state governor’s pardon can 
effectively eliminate a conviction for immigration purposes. Id. In Georgia, for example, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole adjusted its pardon process in a ways that would protect noncitizens facing depor-
tation for low-level convictions. Id. First, the Board made the process available to those convicted of 
misdemeanors. Id. Second, it waived the eligibility waiting period that had previously applied to the 
state’s pardon process. Id. Notably, Georgia is not the only state implementing these types of changes. 
See id. (recognizing that state governors in both New York and California have commuted the sen-
tences of noncitizen defendants convicted of crimes that carry severe immigration consequences). 
 178 Id. at 2; N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS 2 (2020), 
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/RIAC%20RFP%20Final%20010720.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6TS-W5Q7] 
[hereinafter OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES]. The impetus behind the effort was the recogni-
tion that “[e]ven convictions for minor offenses and violations can have disastrous and irrevocable 
consequences for a noncitizen client despite dispositions that may appear innocuous or even favorable 
in terms of the penalty imposed.” N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra, at 2. This was 
particularly important for New York, the state reasoned, because of its large immigrant population. 
See id. at 4 (noting that noncitizens make up approximately 22% of the state’s total population, which 
is well above the nation’s average of 13%). 
 179 Sena, supra note 177, at 2. The state expanded the program to cover family court proceedings 
as well because immigration status has the potential to directly affect important issues such as custo-
dy, visitation, and adoption. N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 178, at 3. 
 180 N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 178, at 6. 
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California, by contrast, has taken a different approach to protecting 
noncitizens charged with marijuana-related offenses.181 The California legisla-
ture enacted a law requiring prosecutors to attempt to avoid adverse immigra-
tion consequences when negotiating plea deals.182 The law also calls for de-
fense counsel to advance arguments pertaining to the collateral consequences 
of a proposed disposition to help ensure that immigration-related issues are 
brought to the prosecutor’s attention.183 
Individual prosecutor’s offices have implemented comparable practic-
es.184 The district attorneys’ offices in Brooklyn and Philadelphia, for example, 
contracted with immigration attorneys to teach the cities’ prosecutors how to 
reduce the prospect of deportation for noncitizen offenders charged with low-
level, nonviolent offenses.185 
Although these programs are undoubtedly encouraging, they do fall short 
of providing counsel to indigent noncitizen defendants charged with low-level 
marijuana offenses.186 For example, in New York, indigent noncitizens may not 
have an attorney who knows to take full advantage of the resources the various 
Centers provide.187 Similarly, many noncitizen defendants in California will 
not have counsel to inform the state’s prosecutors of any immigration-related 
concerns.188 
This is not true, however, of Seattle and King County, which established the 
first Legal Defense Network in 2017.189 The majority of the Network’s funds are 
                                                                                                                      
 181 See Sena, supra note 177, at 2 (describing California’s use of prosecutorial discretion). 
 182 2015 Cal. Stat. 5365; Sena, supra note 177, at 2. The law has received some praise. See, e.g., 
Eagly, supra note 152, at 29 (explaining that the law normalizes consideration of collateral conse-
quences and is faster and more efficient than the alternative: allowing individual county’s prosecutors’ 
offices to develop their own procedures for handling immigration consequences). 
 183 Eagly, supra note 152, at 27. 
 184 Sena, supra note 177, at 2. In Baltimore, Maryland, for example, the state’s attorney told pros-
ecutors to take into account the “unintended collateral consequences that [their] decisions have on 
[the] immigrant population.” Id. 
 185 Id. at 2–3. The policy in Brooklyn requires prosecutors to warn defense attorneys about the pos-
sible immigration consequences their clients face and to attempt to prosecute noncitizen defendants in 
ways that achieve an “immigration-neutral disposition,” so long as they are not jeopardizing public safe-
ty. Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Moves to Protect Immigrants from Deportation Over Petty Crimes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/nyregion/brooklyn-immigrants-deportation-
crime.html [https://perma.cc/A9TL-M85K]. The Brooklyn district attorney’s office reasoned that the 
office is “unflaggingly committed to equal and fair justice for all the people of Brooklyn, and that 
unquestionably includes [its] immigrant population no less than any other.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 186 See Sena, supra note 177, at 2–3 (describing New York and California’s solutions). 
 187 See N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., supra note 178, at 6 (noting that New 
York’s program functions by providing legal support to criminal defense and family law attorneys). 
 188 See Eagly, supra note 152, at 27 (explaining that the California law requires defense counsel 
to present issues of collateral consequences to prosecutors). 
 189 Mayor Durkan and Executive Constantine Announce Expanded Seattle-King County Immi-
grant Legal Defense Network Grantees, KING CNTY. GOV’T (May 29, 2019), https://www.king-
county.gov/elected/executive/constantine/news/release/2019/May/29-immigrant-defense.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5FUB-JPYS]. In addition to providing legal representation, the Network is also working to 
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dedicated to providing legal representation for low-income residents who are 
either detained, facing deportation, or at risk of losing their immigration sta-
tus.190 The Network has already made a significant difference—between October 
2017 and April 2019, the Network provided direct legal representation to more 
than 350 individuals and general legal advice to an additional 339.191 
Other jurisdictions, particularly those that only guarantee counsel to indi-
viduals covered by the Sixth Amendment, should follow suit.192 Unlike New 
York’s Centers and California’s prosecutorial discretion mandate, which are at 
their most effective when immigrants have counsel in the first place, Seattle 
and King County’s Legal Defense Network tackles the issue head on—it pro-
vides legal representation to those who otherwise would not receive it during a 
time when it matters most.193 
B. The MORE Act Makes Descheduling Marijuana  
at the Federal Level a Possibility 
Certainly, descheduling marijuana at the federal level would address the 
issue.194 Although numerous proposals have been introduced over the past sev-
eral years, none have been successful.195 In July 2019, then-Senator Kamala D. 
Harris and Representative Jerrold Nadler, Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, introduced the Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expunge-
ment Act (MORE Act or Act).196 The Act is one of the most extensive marijuana 
                                                                                                                      
combat the anti-immigrant rhetoric that has spread throughout the country under the Trump admin-
istration. Id. The Network also provides mental health examinations to immigrants who are either 
facing or at risk of deportation. Id. The Network was created in response to the significant increase in 
deportations experienced in Washington. Id. Indeed, in 2017, Washington experienced a 25% rise in 
arrests and an 88% rise in deportations. Id. Notably, the arrests and deportations were not limited to 
immigrants with criminal convictions. See id. (noting that this included a 210% rise in arrests and a 
29% rise in deportations of noncitizens who did not even have a criminal record). 
 190 Id. Some funds, however, are given to organizations to bolster their capability to offer legal 
services to the county’s immigrant population. Id. Examples of these organizations include Kids in 
Need of Defense, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and Entre Hermanos. Id. 
 191 Id. The Network spent approximately $1.8 million to do so. Id. 
 192 See id. (highlighting the numerous benefits of the Network). 
 193 Compare id. (stating that Seattle and King County’s Legal Defense Network provides direct 
legal representation), with Sena, supra note 177, at 2–3 (setting forth the limitations of New York and 
California’s solutions). 
 194 See Cunnings, supra note 36, at 561–62 (explaining that the inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds for controlled substances-related conduct reference the CSA). 
 195 See, e.g., Marijuana Freedom and Opportunity Act, S. 3174, 115th Cong. (2018) (striking 
marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols from Schedule I of the CSA); Ending Federal Marijuana Prohi-
bition Act of 2017, H.R. 1227, 115th Cong. (“limit[ing] the application of Federal laws to the distribu-
tion and consumption of marihuana”). 
 196 Marijuana Opportunity Reinvestment and Expungement Act of 2019, H.R. 3884, 116th Cong.; 
Press Release, Congressman Jerry Nadler, Nadler & Harris Introduce Comprehensive Marijuana Re-
form Legislation (July 23, 2019), https://nadler.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=
394017 [https://perma.cc/QQH8-C8TC]. At the time, the bill had over fifty cosponsors. Javier Hasse, 
2088 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:2057 
reform bills ever before Congress.197 If passed, the MORE Act would put an 
end to the federal prohibition of marijuana by removing it from the CSA alto-
gether.198 In so doing, the Act would protect LPRs and other noncitizens from 
adverse immigration consequences resulting from minor marijuana offenses.199 
Thus, noncitizens living in states that have decriminalized marijuana would no 
longer be at a disadvantage.200 
Although the MORE Act passed the House, it seemed unlikely, at least 
prior to the 2020 presidential election, that it would pass the Senate.201 The 
                                                                                                                      
Key Committee in Congress Approves Marijuana Legalization Bill, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2019), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/javierhasse/2019/11/20/marijuana-legalization-judiciary-committee/#e763ea
32c35a [https://perma.cc/9M87-5T68]. In January 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris made history 
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Woman of Color as Vice President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/
07/us/politics/kamala-harris.html [https://perma.cc/HTA3-2JLF]. 
 197 Press Release, supra note 196. 
 198 See H.R. 3884 (stating that one purpose of the Act is “[t]o decriminalize and deschedule can-
nabis”). 
 199 See id. (“For purposes of the immigration laws . . . cannabis may not be considered a con-
trolled substance, and an alien may not be denied any benefit or protection under the immigration laws 
based on any event, including conduct, a finding, an admission, addiction or abuse, an arrest, a juve-
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fore, on, or after the effective date of this Act.”). As part of its comprehensive nature, the MORE Act 
sets forth several corresponding amendments to the INA. Id. Additionally, the MORE Act would 
implement a 5% sales tax on marijuana and marijuana-related products, the revenue from which 
would establish the Opportunity Trust Fund. Press Release, supra note 196. The Opportunity Trust 
Fund includes three grant programs: (1) the Community Reinvestment Grant Program; (2) the Canna-
bis Opportunity Grant Program; and (3) the Equitable Licensing Grant Program. Id. The first, the 
Community Reinvestment Grant Program, is intended to help those most negatively impacted by the 
War on Drugs. See id. (explaining that the program would provide “job training, re-entry services, 
legal aid, literacy programs, youth recreation, mentoring, and substance use treatment”). The second, 
the Cannabis Opportunity Grant Program, would provide loans to “socially and economically disad-
vantaged” small business owners that work within the marijuana industry. Id. Finally, the Equitable 
Licensing Grant Program would support programs that “minimize barriers to marijuana licensing and 
employment for the individuals most adversely impacted by the War on Drugs.” Id. Notably, the Act 
protects against other, non-immigration related collateral consequences of marijuana-based convic-
tions as well. See id. (noting that the Act prohibits the denial of federal public benefits based on a 
marijuana offense as well). 
 200 See generally H.R. 3884. As such, the Act has received support from the Immigrant Legal 
Resource Center and the ACLU, among other advocacy organizations. Press Release, supra note 196. 
 201 See Ryan Bort, Inside the Weed Legalization Bill the House of Representatives Just Passed, 
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/more-act-
marijuana-legalization-bill-vote-1097723/ [https://perma.cc/T74N-6VSN] (providing that the House 
of Representatives passed the MORE Act by a vote of 228-164, falling largely along party lines); Kris 
Kane, Is the SAFE Banking Act on the Ropes? And Other Federal Updates, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kriskrane/2020/02/24/is-the-safe-banking-act-on-the-ropes-and-other-
federal-updates/#5d92d8d21e15 [https://perma.cc/4HYE-ZQS4] (stating that even if the House ap-
proves the MORE Act, its likelihood of being approved by the Senate is “between slim and nonexist-
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Democratic Party, however, narrowly took control of the Senate in January 
2021 with its victories in the Georgia state runoff elections.202 As such, advo-
cates of marijuana legalization may finally have a reason to be optimistic.203 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the categorization of marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the 
CSA, a growing number of states have legalized it for medical and recreational 
use. Other states have simply decriminalized the drug, lowering the penalties 
associated with its use. These changes are significant, as most defendants will 
face fewer meaningful consequences as a result. LPR offenders, however, do 
not share in the good fortune. For one, they may mistakenly believe that they 
can safely admit to marijuana use when communicating with USCIS agents 
and other law enforcement officials in reliance on the jurisdiction’s decriminal-
ization statute, risking their immigration status in the process. Additionally, 
lowering the penalties associated with marijuana-related conduct means that 
fewer noncitizen defendants will be appointed a public defender to advise them 
of the adverse immigration consequences of pleading guilty to seemingly mi-
nor charges. Although the federal government certainly has the power to ad-
dress this issue by legalizing the drug, it has yet to do so. Accepting this, sev-
eral states have taken significant steps in the right direction. They could, how-
ever, go farther in tackling the problem. 
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coming law”). 
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